North Carolina Court Case: In re Maynard

IN THE MATTER OF: ERIC SHANE MAYNARD and MAURICA IRENE MAYNARD 

No. 9322DC970 

COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA 

116 N.C. App. 616; 448 S.E.2d 871 

May 12, 1994, Heard in the Court of Appeals 
October 18, 1994, Filed 

Iredell County. 91 J 135, 136. Appeal by petitioner from order signed 17 May 1993 by Judge George Fuller in Iredell County District Court. 

Affirmed. 

COUNSEL:
Iredell County Department of Social Services, by Susan Nye Surles, Statesville, NC, for petitioner-appellant. 

Neel & Randall, by Mark L. Childers, Mooresville, NC, for respondent-appellee. 

JUDGES:
Sidney S. Eagles, Jr., J., John B. Lewis, Jr., and James A. Wynn, Jr., JJ., concurring. 

OPINION:

EAGLES, Judge.
Petitioner DSS (hereinafter petitioner) contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the Surrenders. After careful review of the record and briefs, we affirm. I.
[1] Petitioner first contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion setting aside the Surrenders. We disagree. The district court has "exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent, undisciplined, abused, neglected, or dependent." G.S. 7A-523. "When the court obtains jurisdiction over a juvenile, jurisdiction shall continue until terminated by order of the court or until [the juvenile] reaches his eighteenth birthday." G.S. 7A-524. Petitioner alleged that respondent's children were neglected in August of 1991 and the district court adjudicated respondent's children as neglected and dependent in September 1991. Accordingly, the district court acquired jurisdiction of respondent's children beginning in late 1991. 
While the statutes do not explicitly address who has jurisdiction to consider a motion to set aside a Surrender, we have previously held that a district court's jurisdiction over a case involving a juvenile ends when an adoption petition is filed. In Re Adoption Of Duncan, 112 N.C. App. 196, 201, 435 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1993) (citations omitted). Here, no petition for adoption had been filed. On this record, the motion to set aside the Surrenders is a matter properly within the district court's jurisdiction.
II.
[2] Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred by basing its decision to grant respondent's motion on the ground that respondent was denied her right to counsel. Petitioner argues that counsel's presence is not required when a parent signs a consent to adoption form. In support of its position, petitioner contends that since Chapter 7A does not address the issue of whether counsel should be present when a parent consents to his or her child's adoption, the absence of counsel could not have violated the statute. While Chapter 7A does not explicitly address this issue, G.S. 7A-587 provides that:

in cases where the juvenile petition alleges that a juvenile is abused, neglected or dependent, the parent has the right to counsel and to appointed counsel in cases of indigency unless the parent waives the right.